St. John's Law Review
Volume 6, May 1932, Number 2

Article 3

World Citizenship
Chester Rohrlich

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

WORLD CITIZENSHIP

LEGAL
anomalies have a persistence
fascination. equalled only by
their inconvenience-and
The history of nationality is so predominately characterized by the helplessness of the individual and the jealous
exclusiveness and expansiveness of the State that the continued existence of two conditions apparently free from
both influences arrests attention.
I.
Jurists have persistently inveighed against the "man
without a country." Weiss says 1 "man can no more conceive himself without a fatherland than he can without a
family." Mr. Justice Paterson 2 regarded "a citizen of the
world" as "a creature of the imagination, far too refined
for any republic of ancient or modern times", and in a
Treatise on Citizenship written fifty years ago the author I
declared: "'A man without a country' may be an interesting subject of fiction; but the public law of modern states
is not disposed to recognize such a nondescript."
Despite these positive assertions of their theoretical impossibility, men sans patrie, heimathlosen, have existed and
continue to exist. "An individual may be destitute of
nationality knowingly or unknowingly, intentionally or
through no fault of his own", says Oppenheim 4 in recognition of a fact which he regards as a "blemish in Law."
During the second half of the nineteenth century the number of stateless persons in Europe was so great that many
Continental powers, unwilling to harbor men not liable to
military service anywhere, adopted legislation designed to
lessen "international vagabondage." 5 David Dudley Field
11

DloIr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (2d Ed. 1907) 20-21.
'Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 133, 153 (1795).
ALEXANDER P.

MORSE.

Int. Law (3d Ed. 1920) Vol. 1, Ch. III, Part V.
Weiss, supra note 1, at pp. 23-4; 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d Ed. 1910) Ch. X. The States were not the only victims of statelessness.
Prior to 1919 Jews in Roumania were treated as foreigners (really as state6
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in his proposed Outlines of an Internatioiml Code (1876)
provided (Sec. 248) that "every person has a national
character."
Notwithstanding this pressure against it, statelessness,
resulting not only from inharmonious and conflicting nationality laws 6 but even from the voluntary choice of the
continues to be recognized as a legal and valid
individual,
7
status.
In so far as statelessness is voluntary on the part of
the individual, it must find its basic justification in the
individual's right of expatriation.
The English common law recognized no such right of
expatriation. "It is not in the power of any private subject to shake off his allegiance." 8
less) for the purpose of being denied civil rights but were nevertheless held
subject to military service. By its Treaty of Dec. 9, 1919, with the Allied
and Associated Powers, Roumania recognized as subjects Jewish inhabitants

who were otherwise stateless. Oppenheim, supra note 4, at p. 485.
'Adolf Hitler, the German political leader, was until very recently a
conspicuous modem example of a "man without a country." Born an Austrian
he lost his Austrian citizenship by serving in the German Army during the
World War. He did not, however, acquire German citizenship in accordance

with German law until February 25, 1932 (New York Times, Feb. 26, 1932,
p. 9).
"France: Sequestre de Ullman, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 44 Journal
du Droit International 219 (1916), Sequestre de Friederick, Cour d'appel
d'Aix, 48 Journal du Droit International 931 (1921), Sequestre de Kampfmeyer, Cour de Cassation, 49 Journal du Droit International 399 (1922).
Roumania: while theoretically acknowledging "statelessness" treats the
stateless one as if he were a national of his country of origin, Zamfirsco v.
Minister of Finance, Tribunal of Ilov, 54 Journal du Droit International 1172
(1926).
England: The authorities are in conflict. It was said in Stoeck v.
Public Trustee, 2 Ch. 67 (1921), "that the condition of a stateless person is
not a condition unrecognized by the municipal law of this Country." In an
earlier case, Ex panrte Weber, 1 K B. 280 (1916), followed in Ex parte
Liebman, 1 K. B. 268 (1916), Lord Justice Phillimore said, "Modern national
legislation has allowed persons to procure nationality in countries which are
not the countries of their origin; but it is going a step further to say that any
country has recognized that a man can shake off his position as a national
of the country in which he was born without acquiring the duties and responsibilities of a national of some other country." Ex"parte Weber was
affirmed by the House of Lords, 1 A. C. 421 (1916), but the question whether
England would recognize "statelessness" was expressly reserved. In a statement made to the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1930, Arthur Henderson,
then Foreign Secretary, recognized that under certain circumstances a British
woman might become "a stateless person," New York Times, Jan. 28, 1930.
'Proceedings against Aeneas Macdonald for High Treason, 18 How.
S. Tr. 857. 859 (1747). For a brief r~sum6 of "expatriation" in ancient
times see MAXSON, CTiz nsHnIP (1930), pp. 132-134.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

The early American doctrine fluctuated between the
English doctrine of "indissoluble" allegiance and the individualism of Thomas Jefferson, which found expression
in the Virginia Law of 1779 1 recognizing the "natural
right" of a citizen of Virginia to expatriate himself. 10
In 1867 two naturalized American citizens, Warren
and Costello, actively participated in the Irish Fenian
Movement. They were seized in Ireland and charged with
treason. They demanded a trial by a jury de medietate
linguae, then allowed by the law of England to aliens, on
the ground of their American citizenship. This demand
was refused because of their original British citizenship.
Their trial and conviction which followed provoked widespread discussion of the subject of expatriation. In England it resulted in a law"' declaring that any British
subject who, when in a foreign country, becomes naturalized
therein, ceases to be a British subject. The United States
Congress declared 12 "the right of expatriation a natural
and inherent right- of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" and branded as "inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic" any denial or questioning
of "the right of expatriation." 13
At the present time the right of expatriation, subject
10 HENING'S STATUTES-AT-LARGE, C. IV, p. 129.
KENT'S CoMM. 49; 3 MooRE's DIGEST, INTERNATIONAL LAW

552-579.
'Act of May 14, 1870, 33 Vict. Ch. 14. This legislation followed a report
"2

in favor of expatriation submitted by a Special Committee appointed by the

Queen. R. W. Flournoy, Jr., Naturalization and Expatriation (1922) 31 YALE
L. J. 702, 713.
Act of July 27, 1868, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 15. An earlier proposed expatriation statute was not enacted, Flournoy, supra note 11 at pp. 711-713.
" The right of expatriation extends to the relationship between Indians
and their tribes, U. S. ex rel. Standing Bear v .Crook, 5 Dillon 453 (C. C. D.
Neb., 1879). The right may not be exercised in times of war, 8 U. S. C. A.
sec. 16; Rex v. Lynch, 1 K. B. 444 (1903). Nor may it be exercised by persons under disability, U. S. ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F. (2d) 44 (S. D.
N. Y., 1928). Although courts have occasionally called attention to the inconsistency involved in limitations upon a "natural and inherent" right [i.e.,
Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N. D. N. Y., 1919)] it is accepted that Congress may impose limitations upon its exercise. For a suggestion that recent
American immigration policies indicate the "Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation" see Borchard, 25 Am. Jr. Int. Law 312
(1931).
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restrictions, is recognized by
to varying qualifications and
14
a great majority of nations.
The right to be stateless does not necessarily follow
from the mere right of expatriation. 15 Whether it does or
not depends upon whether the assumption of a new allegiance is an essential part of the act of expatriation. 6
It may be stated as a universal principle that removal
of original nativity is an
from the territory of the state
7
essential step in expatriation.'
The citizenship laws of Germany 18 have been construed
so as not to require the assumption of a new allegiance as
a condition precedent to expatriation."0 On the other hand,
certain expatriation statutes expressly require the assumption of a new allegiance.20
"See

A

COLLECTION OF NATIONALITY

CONTAINED IN

CONSTITUTIONS,

LAWS OF VARIOUS

COUNTRIES

AS

STATUTES AND TREATIES, edited by R. W.

FLOURNOY, JR. and M. 0. HUDSON (1929).
See Phillimore, L. J. in Ex parte Weber, mtpra note 7.
The problem was considered from the viewpoint of the state by Sir J.
F. Williams in "Denationalization," 1927 BItTISHa YEAR BooK OF INT. LAW,
p. 45. He concluded "Positive International Law does not forbid a state
unilaterally to sever the relationship of nationality so far as the individual
is concerned, even if the person affected possessed or acquires no other nationality, still a state cannot sever the tie in such a way as to release itself
from the international duty, owed to other states, of receiving back a person
denationalized who has acquired no other nationality, should he be expelled
as an alien by the state where he happens to be."
'The Santissma Trinidad, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 283, 347-8 (1822); Comitis
v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. 556, 559-560 (C. C. E. D. La., 1893) ; Fish v. Stoughton,
2 Johns (N. Y.) 407 (1801). The Virginia Act, supra note 9, made expatriation effective from the time of departure. The German statutes, infra
note 18, expressly require removal within a stated period after renunciation
of citizenship. At common law a woman did not lose her citizenship by
marrying an alien without leaving the country, Wallenberg v. Mo. Pac. Ry.,
159 Fed. 217 (C. C. D. Neb., 1908); In re Fitzroy, 4 F. (2d) 541 (D. C.
Mass., 1925); Petition of Zogbaum, 32 F. (2d) 911 (D. C. So. Da., 1929).
Contra: It re Wohlgemuth, 35 F. (2d) 1007 (D. C. W. D. Mich., 1929).
Under the Act of March 2, 1907, a woman lost her citizenship under such
circumstances, Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 36 Sup. Ct. 106 (1915) ; In re
Martorana, 159 Fed. 1010 (E. D. Penna., 1908).
' Law of June 1, 1870, of North German Confederation translated in
House Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 329-330, and in Ex parte Risse,
257 Fed. 102 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1919); The German Imperial and State
Citizenship Law of July 22, 1913 (Delbruck Law) translated in Supplement
to Vol. 8, Am. Jr. Int. Law (1914).
" Cases cited, supra note 7. It is interesting to note that even in Germany
men who were "stateless" were seized for military service during the World
War, see Ex parte Gilroy, 257 Fed. 110, 120 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1919).
'-i.e., Norway, see Law (No. 3) of Aug. 8, 1924, Sec. 10, printed in
British Parl. Papers, 1927 Misc. No. 2, Cmd. 2852, p. 52.
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The United States statutes provide:

21

"Any American citizen shall be deemed to have
expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in
any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or
when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any for-

eign state.Y'22
Are the two indicated methods of expatriation for
native-born citizens (naturalization and oath of allegiance)
exclusive?
23
Counsel in 1795 arguing before the Supreme Court
urged that,
"A man's last will as to his citizenship may be
likened to his last will as to his estate; * * * -but
in both cases, as good Christians and good Republicans
it must be presumed that he rises to another, if not
to a better, life and country,"
and in the same case 24 Mr. Justice Iredell stated that he
had no doubt that the method of expatriation set forth in
the Virginia statute already noted was exclusive.
However, in two cases 25 before the Statute of 1868, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the question as to whether
one may divest himself of his citizenship except in a manner
indicated by the legislature.
The state courts were generally of the opinion that assumption of a new citizenship is essential to expatriation.20
Attorneys-General of the United States who were called
upon to consider the question were of the opinion that a new
naturalization, or at least a submission to the obligations
' 8 U. S. C. A., Sec. 17, enacted March 2, 1907, as result of recommendations made by a Citizenship Board appointed by the Secretary of State,
House Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.
'In the case of naturalized citizens provision is also made for presumptions of loss of citizenship arising out of residence in country of origin.
'Talbot v. Janson, supra note 2.
2,
At p. 164.
'Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch (U. S.) 64, 120 (1804);
The Santissma Trinidad, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 283, 347-8-(1822).
'Alsberg v. Hawkins, 9 Dana (Ky.) 177 (1839); Quinby v. Duncan, 4
Har. (Del.) 383 (1846); Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356, 374-5 (1863).
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owing to a new country, were essential to effectuate ex27
patriation.
No case has arisen since the Act of 1907 involving the
status of a native-born American citizen voluntarily seeking release from citizenship in ways other than enumerated
in the statute. The few courts which have considered the
possibility are divided in their opinions. A Circuit Court
of Appeals has said 28 that the Act provides the "only means
by which the expatriation of a native-born American citizen
may be accomplished." But two District Court judges have
expressed contrary views.29
Although there is no direct authority to that effect,
and some dicta to the contrary, it is believed that at the
present time, having in mind the early common-law doctrines
and the opposition of jurists to the notion of statelessness,
it would be held that a new allegiance is essential to the
surrender of an old. A contrary holding would involve a
more complete acceptance than presently prevails of the
view that states receive no more or greater benefits from
citizens than citizens receive from states. Of course, the
development of international government may gradually
bring greater tolerance for "citizens of the world," as the
United States now has citizens who are not citizens of any
one of the states3 0
Those who are convinced of the evils of statelessness
have offered many proposals for its eradication. They include (a) that citizenship follow domicile; 31 (b) that the
country of residence require residents either to become
'BLAcKc, 9 Op. 62, 356 (1857-9); WILLIAmS, 14 Op. 295 (1873).
' Leong Kwai Yin v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A., 9th,
1929).
SE.r parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (D. C. N. D. N. Y., 1916); U. S. Ex
rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F. (2d) 219 (D. C. W. D. Penna., 1929).
1Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 74, 83 U. S. 36 (1872);
Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1912); Hough v.
Societe Electrique Westinghouse, 231 Fed. 341 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1916). As
to whether Indians are not "stateless aliens" see D. 0. McGovney, American
Citizenship (1911) 11 CoL. L. Rav. 231, 326-337. For a discussion of British
citizenship see Pollak, 20 Am. Jr. Int. Law 714. The development of international government has been materially influenced by the organization of the
modern federal systems, see MOWER, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, pp. 21-23.
Hall, Int. Law (8th ed.) Sec. 74; Weiss, supra note 1, at p. 24.
H

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

naturalized or to leave; 32 or (c) that expatriation be
made expressly contingent upon the assumption of a new
3a
nationality.

The opposite side of the shield of world citizenship to
statelessness is multi-citizenship. As the unfortunate result of different laws of nationality the not infrequent person with dual nationality has long been an object of
commiseration on the part of international jurists. Double
allegiance has uniformly been declared impossible in theory
and vicious in consequences. 34 In practice, most states have
jealously demanded a single undivided allegiance. The contrary practice is, however, not without precedent. The ancient Grecian City-States recognized "rnultantm cives
civitaten." 35 The feudal system permitted the holding of
fiefs under more than one lord. 36 France and the United
States after the American Revolution granted citizenship
to certain nationals of the other as a mark of honor. It
was probably nothing more solid than these courtesycitizenships that led Chief Justice Rutledge to state that
"a man may at the same time enjoy the rights of citizenship
under two governments." 37 United States law is now certainly to the contrary. As we have seen, the assumption of
a new nationality ipso facto results in loss of United States
2

Oppenheim, supra note 4.

'Weiss, supra note 1. This last method appears to be the one in greatest
favor with international lawyers, see Draft Convention submitted to Comm.
of Experts for the Progressive Codification of Int. Law of League of Nations,
reprinted in 20 Am. Jr. Int. Law, Supp., pp. 21-61, and Draft Convention on
Nationality prepared by Research in Int. Law of Harvard Law School, 23
Am. Jr. Int. Law Supplement.
'Weiss, supra note 1, at pp. 24-32; 1 WESTLAKE, INT. LAW (2d Ed.),
Ch. X; "Citizentship," A. P. Morse; "Domicile, Double-Allegiance, and World
Citizenship," I. H. Wigmore, 21 ILL. L. REv. 761; 1 BLACxSTONE 370, cited
with approval in Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445, 450 (D. C. N. D. N. Y., 1916).
' Cicero, Pro Balbo, cited by Weiss, supra note 1; Mason, supra note 8.
Modern Greece for two years (1925-27) had provisions for the naturalization
of non-residents, see Law of Sept. 10, 1925, repealed by Decree Law of Oct.
15, 1927, reprinted in Nationality Laws, etc. (note 14) at pp. 318-320.

'WESTLAKE,

supra note 34.

' Talbot v. Janson, szpra note 2.
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citizenship. 38 The Naturalization Statute requires all applicants for citizenship "to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty," 39 and requires residence within the
United States. 40 These requirements are typical of those
of most modern states. There are, however, interesting
exceptions.
The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law of
July 22, 1913, 41 provided for the granting of German citizenship to "a former German who had not taken up his
residence in Germany," 42 and provided that "Citizenship
is not lost by one who before acquiring foreign citizenship
has secured on application the written consent of the competent authorities of his home State to retain his citizenship." 43 These "new interpretations of citizenship" which
carried the "principle of dual nationality further than it
has ever been carried before" provoked considerable adverse
criticism. 44 Dr. Hill saw a possible, but "grossly sophistical," theoretical justification for the legislation as a derivation from the old conception that there can be no expatriation without the consent of the country of origin. If the
state's consent is necessary, it may, on this view, grant the
consent with reservations. Mr. Flournoy recognized as
underlying the German statute the notion that service to
the state rather than domicile within its borders is the basis
for citizenship. This view, indeed, is expressly stated in the
laws of certain states. Persia admits to citizenship "without fulfilling the conditions of domicile" persons "who have
rendered a public service to Persia or who have given Persia
considerable assistance." 45 Brazil extends like privilege to
a person "recommended by his talent and learning, or by
8 U. S. C. A., sec. 17.
8 U. S. C. A., secs. 373, 379.
S
8 U. S. C. A., secs. 379, 382.
"Supra note 18.
4 Sec. 33.
This was also applicable to descendants of former Germans
and to their adopted children.
'Sec. 25.
"See Flournoy, (1914) 8 Am. Jr. Int. Law 477; Hill, 12 Am. Jr. Int.
Law (1918) 356.
'Art. V, Law of Sept. 7, 1929, reprinted in Nationality Laws, etc. (note
14) at p. 474.
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married
professional capability," as well as to all who 4are
6
to Brazilians or who own real estate in Brazil.
The opposition to the German statute culminated in
Article 278 of the Treaty of Versailles 47 whereby Germany
undertook "to recognize any new nationality which has been
or may be acquired by her nationals under the laws of the
Allied and Associated Powers * * * and to recognize such
persons as having * ** in all respects severed their allegiance to their country of origin."
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful life of this German
legislation the idea did not perish. The laws of Soviet
Russia contemplate the granting of a special form of citizenship in the Soviet Union to non-resident foreigners.4 8
More interesting, however, is the very new constitution of
Republican Spain, 49 which seems to look forward to the
possibility of creating a world-wide Spanish Unity. It
provides: 50
"The procedure whereby persons of Spanish origin living in other countries may obtain Spanish
citizenship shall be established by law" (Art. 23).
"On the basis of effective international reciprocity and by means of requirements and procedure
fixed by law, citizenship shall be granted to the natives of Portugal and Spanish-American countries,
including Brazil, should they request it, provided
that they reside in Spanish territory, without losing
or modifying the citizenship of their country of
"Art. 6 of Legislative Decree No. 904 of Nov. 12, 1902, reprinted in
Nationality Laws, etc. (note 14) at p. 5.
' Dated June 28, 1919, between Germany and Allied and Associated
Powers.
4 Pars. 9, 11, Decree 202 of Oct. 29, 1924, reprinted in Nationality Laws,
etc. (note 14) at pp. 511, 513-514. Something of this character was probably
contemplated by Field in his suggested Outline of an International Code
(1876) when he stipulated (sec. 248) "No person is a member of two nations
at the same time; but any nation may extend to a member of another nation,
with his consent, the rights and duties of its own members, within its own
jurisdiction, in addition to his own national character."
Adopted Dec., 1931.
The author is indebted to a translation made by Pedro Villa Fernandez
and Warren Moss for Current History and by it made available to him.
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origin. In such countries, if not legally forbidden,
and even if the rights of reciprocity are not recognized, Spaniards may be naturalized without losing
the citizenship of their country of origin" (Art. 24).
There is no reason for assuming that this attempt to
legalize a voluntary dual-nationality, although limited in
scope, will achieve any greater success than earlier attempts.
States are still competitive, and the unfortunate predicament of an individual doubly blessed with citizenship in
the event of a conflict between his two countries is too obvious to require elaboration. Even in the possible case of
reciprocal legislation on the subject the ultimate achievement would be a sort of "alternate citizenship," the controlling one being the one of the current domicile.
III.
Even when outside the territorial limits of his state a
citizen is, in many important respects, subject to its laws.5521
He may be recalled and penalized for his failure to return.
He may be taxed. 3 He may be punished for crimes against
54
its laws even when they are committed outside its territory.
'Blackmer v. United States, decided by U. S. Supreme Court, Feb. 15,
1932, 52 S. Ct. 252; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad,
pp. 21-24; American Law Institute Restatement of Law of Conflicts of Law,
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, sec. 86. The exercise of this extra-territorial
jurisdiction over non-resident nationals may, of course, be limited by constitutional and treaty limitations. And, of course, the alien simultaneously owes
duties to the state wherein he resides, Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall.
(U. S.) 147, 83 U. S. 147 (1872).
'Blackmer v. United States, supra note 51; 1 Hyde Int. Law, pp. 668-9.
Of course he may not be seized on foreign territory and forcibly brought
back, see Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 83 U. S. 610 (1872) re the
Trent affair.
' Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 444 (1924).
"Blackmer v. United States, supra note 51. Rex v. Sawyer, 2 C. & K.
101; Rex v. Casement (1917) 1 K. B. 98; REPORT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COMM. ON PRoGREssIVE CODIFICATION OF INT. LAW, "Criminal Competence
of States in Respect of Offenses Committed Outside their Territory," reprinted in 20 Am. Jr. Int. Law (1926), Spec. Supp. at pp. 252-8. Such
punishment does not necessarily bar punishment by the state wherein the
crime was committed; People v. Papaccio, 140 Misc. 696, 18 Griff. 696
(N. Y. 1931). Moore (2 Digest Int. Law, 255-7) indicates great doubt as to
the "expediency and justice" of the exercise by a state of the extra-territorial
criminal jurisdiction over its citizens except in special cases.
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In American law this penal jurisdiction is limited by the
notion that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." 55 However, even here it continues at least
as to acts which may react prejudicially upon the state
itself. 6 He may be subjected to judgments obtained against
him in absentia.5 7 And, of course, his conduct abroad may
deprive him of the right to demand the protection due a
citizen.5 8 Within his own state he will, generally, not be
accepted as a diplomatic representative of another.5 9 These
exercises of extra-territorial control over citizens are recognized as legitimate by international law 00 and although
they need not be enforced by other states, except as required by treaty, they are valid as between the citizen and
his own state 61 and so offer well-nigh insurmountable difficulties to the "double-citizen" even in times of peace.
CHESTER R0HRLICH.

New York City.
'Holmes, J., in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S.
347, 356, 29 Sup. Ct. 493 (1908) ; 1 Hyde Int. Law 423.
' United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 43 Sup. Ct. 39 (1922) ; 18 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 5 (The Logan Act prohibiting unauthorized correspondence with
foreign governments).
" Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N. E. 1113 (1914) recognizing the
validity of such a judgment against a German in Germany but refusing to
give it effect here.
' Borchard, sufpra note 51 at p. 713 et seq. Certain writers fail to note
the distinction between loss of this right of protection and expatriation.
" 2 Phillimore, Int. Law (3d Ed.) Sec. 135; Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S.
403 (1889); cf. Macartney v. Garbutt, 24 Q. B. D. 368 (1890).
'°1 Oppenheim, Int. Law (4th Ed.) 281; authorities cited note 51.
' Borchard, supra note 51, at pp. 22-3.

